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It is well-known that constructions involving ellipsis (i .e. construction in which 
semantically interpreted material is not realized phonologically, henceforth ECs) 
share many properties with constructions that involve phonological reduction (in 
which semantically interpreted material is realized phonologically but in a 
reduced form, henceforth PRCs) . (See, among others, Lasnik 1 972, Chomsky and 
Lasnik 1 993 , Rooth 1 992 and Tancredi 1 992.)  The similarity between ECs and 
PRCs is semantic: the interpretation of both is constrained by the interpretation of 
an antecedent (Parallelism) . Rooth and Tancredi have pointed out that this 
similarity follows from an independently needed theory of focus. 
However, there are also differences in the interpretation of ECs and PRCs. 
The semantic restrictions on ECs appear to be stronger than the restrictions on 
PRCs. Specifically, there are cases in which phonological reduction (PR) is 
licensed via Parallelism with an antecedent which is not present in the discourse 
(accommodation) ,  and in (at least some of) these cases ellipsis (E) is not licensed. 
This fact has motivated Rooth ( 1 992) to propose a special identity condition 
which applies to E but not to PRo Under this proposal, the similarity between the 
two constructions follows from the theory of focus (which applies to both 
constructions) and the difference follows from the identity condition (which 
applies only to one) . The aim of this paper is to argue for an alternative. 
Specifically, I will argue that the difference between ECs and PRCs follows from 
an economy condition on accommodation which is relevant for both constructions 
but is sensitive to properties that distinguish between them. 
1. Ellipsis and Phonological Reduction - similarities and differences 
The goal of this paper is to provide an account of the similarities and differences 
between ECs and PRCs.  In this section, I will summarize the relevant 
observations ,  which were made by Rooth ( 1 992) and Tancredi ( 1 992) . We will 
see (a) that both ECs and PRCs are subject to a form of parallelism, (b) that this 
follows from the theory of focus,  and (c) that, nevertheless ,  there are cases in 
which PR is possible and E is not. 
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1 . 1 .  Similarities between Ellipsis and Phonological Reduction 
Constituents containing E or PR must receive a parallel interpretation to the 
interpretation of an antecedent . More specifically when an antecedent i s  
ambiguous, the relevant constituent that contains E or PR must be disambiguated 
in the same manner that the antecedent is; ambiguities do not multiply in ECs and 
PRCs. This is exemplified in ( 1 -3) . }  
( 1 )  Identity of predication: 
a. John likes flying planes because BILL does. 
b. John likes flying planes because BILL likes flying planes. 
(2) Identity of dependencies: 
a. John} introduced Fred to his }  mother. Bill2 did, too <introduce Fred3 to 
his2l*3 mother>. 
b. John} introduced Fred to his }  mother. Bill introduced Fred3 to hisu*3 mother, 
too. 
(3) Identity of Scopal relations: 
a. First I introduced a boy to every girl and then YOU did. 
b. First I introduced a boy to every girl and then YOU introduced a boy to 
every girl. 
c. A boy admires every teacher and a GIRL does, too. 
d. A boy admires every teacher and a GIRL admires every teacher, too. 
The antecedent for E and PR in ( 1 ) ,  John likes flying planes, contains an 
ambiguous predicate. Parallelism ensures that the elided/reduced predicate will be 
disambiguated in the same manner. Thus, if the sentence attributes to John the 
property of liking the activity of flying planes, it cannot attribute to Bill the 
property of liking planes that fly .  The same properties must be attributed to John 
and Bill. Similarly in (2) when the pronoun in the antecedent sentence is bound by 
the subject, the pronoun in the ellipsis/reduction sentence cannot be bound by the 
object. If ellipsis/reduction is resolved by sloppy identity, the pronouns must be 
bound from parallel syntactic positions .  Finally when the antecedent and the 
ellipsis/reduction sentence contain more than one quantifier, the relative scope of 
the quantifiers must be identical in the two sentences ,  as illustrated by the 
interpretations available in (3). 
1.2.  Focus and Parallelism 
As pointed out by Rooth ( 1 992) and Tancredi ( 1 992), the effects of Parallelism 
observed in ( 1 -3) follow from an independently needed theory of focus. Sentences 
that contain E or PR share prosodic properties which have very specific 
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implications for their focus structure . That i s ,  a constituent which is  
phonologically reduced or elided doesn' t  bear pitch accent, and this  has 
consequences for its focus structure: the elided/reduced constituent is not F( ocus)­
marked. Furthermore, given the nature of focus projection, it is not dominated by 
an F-marked constituent.2 
To explain how the parallelism requirement follows, I will make a 
simplifying assumption about the domain at which focus presuppositions are 
determined (the focus domain) . Specifically, I will assume that the domain is 
sentential . The general theory of focus requires that for every focus domain, the 
discourse will contain an antecedent -- a linguistic object which is a member of 
the focus value. Parallelism then follows as a consequence of focus theory : 
(4) Parallelism (first attempt) : Every sentence, S, requires that the discourse 
will contain an antecedent sentence, A, which belongs to the focus value of 
S. 3 
It follows that ellipsis and phonological reduction require an antecedent sentence 
which is parallel to the ellipsis sentence, in the sense illustrated in ( 1 -3 ) .  To see 
this, consider the constructions in (2) . 
(2) a. John} introduced Fred to his} mother. Bill2 did, too <introduce Fred3 to 
hisv*3 mother>. 
b. John} introduced Fred to his } mother. Bill2 introduced Fred3 to his2/* 3 
mother, too. 
Because there is no pitch accent in the verb phrase, the verb phrase is  not F­
marked. The subject, on the other hand, has to be F-marked (since it is  distinct 
from the subject of the antecedent sentence) . The focus value of the second 
sentence is either (5a) or (5b) depending on whether the pronoun his is bound by 
the subject Bill or by the object Fred. 4 
(5) a. F([Bill] P introduced Fred3 to his2 mother) = { S :  3x [S = x introduced 
Fred3 to x' s mother] } 
b. F([Bill] F introduced Fred3 to his3 mother) = { S :  3x [S = x introduced 
Fred3 to his3 mother] } . 
John] introduced Fred to his] mother is a member of to the former but 
not of the latter. 
It is now easy to see that the antecedent sentence is a member of the focus value 
of the sentence containing E or PR only if the subject is the binder of the pronoun 
in the latter (that is, only if (5a) is the focus value) . 
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1 . 3. Differences Between Ellipsis and Phonological Reduction 
The picture that emerges at this point is very simple. ECs and PRCs have the 
same focus structure, and given an independently needed theory of focus both 
must satisfy a parallelism requirement. However, it turns out that things are a little 
bit more complicated. Specifically, it turns out that the theory of focus yields a 
parallelism requirement which is weaker than the one stated in (4) .  This 
requirement accounts for the environments in which PR is possible but is  too 
weak to account for E. 
Consider the PRCs in (6) . In these constructions, Parallelism as defined in 
(4) is not satisfied.  There is no antecedent in the discourse which belongs to the 
focus value of sentence that contains PRo The only available antecedent, Bill 
called Mary an idiot is not a sentence of the form x insulted her and thus is not a 
member of the focus value of [JohnJF insulted her. 
(6) a. First Bill called Mary an idiot. Then [John]p insulted her. 
b. John talked to every woman he saw.  [Bill]p talked to many women, too. 
Because PR is licensed in (6),  we must conclude that focus theory yields a weaker 
parallelism requirement than (4) . More specifically, it seems that the antecedent 
for focus need not be present in the discourse; it can be accommodated when it is 
entailed by the sentences that are present in the discourse together with certain 
shared assumptions .  The first sentence in (6a) does not belong to the focus value 
of the sentence that contains PR (henceforth, SPR) ' However, with the assumption 
that calling someone an idiot is an insult, the first sentence entails  the 
accommodated sentence Bill insulted Mary and the latter belongs to F(SPR) ' 
Similarly, with the assumption that John saw many women, the first sentence in 
(6b) entails the accommodated sentence John talked to many woman, which 
belongs to F(SPR) ' Focus theory requires either Direct Parallelism as defined in (4) 
or Indirect Parallelism (via accommodation) : 
(7) Parallelism: Every sentence, S, requires either 
a. that the discourse will contain an antecedent sentence, A ,  which 
belongs to the focus value of S. (Ae F(S» (Direct Parallelism) 
or 
b. that the discourse will contain a sentence, A ,  which together with 
certain shared assumptions entai l s  another sentence , the 
accommodated sentence, AC, and ACe F(S) . (Indirect Parallelism)S 
Parallelism, as defined in (7) , can still account for the phenomena 
exemplified in ( 1 -3) .6 However, it turns out that (7) is too weak to account for the 
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conditions that must be met for ellipsis to be possible. This is seen when we 
compare the constructions that involve PR, (6) , to their counterparts with E in (8) .  
(8) a. * First Bill called Mary an idiot. Then [John]p did <insult her>. 
b .  * John talked to every woman he saw .  [Bill]p did, too <talk to many 
women>. 
2. The proposal 
What we' ve learned in the previous section is that although the theory of focus 
accounts for the constraints on PR and for a substantial part of the constraints on 
E, there are some restrictions on E that it cannot account for. Specifically focus 
theory, which must allow for Indirect Parallelism to account for the availability of 
PR in (6), does not account for the unavailability of E in (8) .  
There must be something other than focus that accounts for the inability of 
Indirect Parallelism to license E in (8). Two possibilities come to mind. The first 
is that while both E and PR are constrained by (7), there is an additional condition 
which restricts E but not PRo The second possibility is that there is a condition on 
the availability of the accommodated sentences (needed for Indirect Parallelism) 
and this condition distinguishes ECs from PRCs. Rooth ( 1 992) investigates the 
first possibility and Tancredi ( 1 992) investigates the second. 
2. 1 .  Tancredi 's proposal and Rooth 's argument against it 
Tancredi ( 1 992) points out that in PRCs, in contrast to ECs ,  the phonologically 
reduced material indicates the nature of the accommodated sentence. In ellipsis 
there is no such indication (since the material is deleted) . Therefore, Tancredi 
proposes that E, in contrast to PR, must satisfy Direct Parallelism. (Tancredi 
1 992: 1 27- 1 3 1 ; see also Wold 1995). 
Rooth, however, discovered a case in which E, just like PR, is licensed via 
Indirect Parallelism. First consider the EC in (9) . This construction exemplifies 
the requirement of identical dependencies discussed in section 1 . 1 .  If the object is 
the binder of the pronouns in the antecedent sentence, the subject cannot bind the 
pronoun in the ellipsis sentence. 
(9) First John told Mary! I was bad-mouthing heft , and then 
[Sue]p told [Jane]p [ was <bad mouthing her> 
a. <bad-mouthing Jane> b. <*bad-mouthing Sue>7 
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This fact follows from Direct Parallelism in a straightforward way .  The focus 
value of the ellipsis sentence will have the antecedent sentence as a member only 
if in the ellipsis sentence the object binds the pronoun. Rooth' s  observation is that 
Indirect Parallelism sometimes obviates the identical dependency requirement. 
Consider, for example, the ECs in ( 10) . 
( 1 0) a. First John told MarY2 I was bad-mouthing her2, and then 
[Suet 1F  heard [ was <bad-mouthing her t >. 
b. John told every girh I was bad-mouthing her2. 
Even [Suet1F  heard [ was <bad-mouthing hert>.  
In these constructions the binding dependencies are not identical : the object binds 
the pronoun in the ellipsis sentence, while in the antecedent sentence the subject 
does. Consequnetly the antecedent sentence is not in the focus value of the ellipsis 
sentence (which contains sentences of the form x heard that I was bad-mouthing 
x). Indirect Parallelism accounts for this mismatch. The antecedent sentence 
allows the accommodation of the sentence Mary/every girl heard that I was bad­
mouthing her and the latter belongs to the focus value of the ellipsis sentence. 
Given ( 10) (and an additional consideration to which I return in section 5) 
Rooth concludes that in addition to Parallelism as defined in (7) ,  there is a special 
identity condition which applies to E but not to PRo This condition explains the 
unavailability of E in (8), in contrast to the availability of PR in (6) . 
2.2. A problems for the formulation of the identity condition 
Rooth ' s  Identity condition on E is meant to ensure that an elided VP would not be 
substantially different from the antecedent VP as in (8). In the next sub-section, I 
will suggest a different way of looking at the contrast between (6) and (8) .  But first 
I would like to point out a difficulty in the formulation of the identity condition. 
Consider cases of Antecedent Contained Deletion exemplified in ( 1 1 ) .  At 
Surface Structure the antecedent VP contains the elided VP and therefore the two 
are not identical . This means that the identity condition on E can be satisfied at 
Logical Form (LF) once QR has taken place and (as a result) the VPs are identical. 
( 1 1 )  I saw every man that you did <saw t>. 
Consider now ( 1 2) ,  and focus on the interpretation in which the adjective likely 
outscopes the subject (scopal relationships being identical in the ellipsis and the 
antecedent sentence as (7) requires) . 
( 1 2) Someone from NY is likely to win the lottery and someone from Boston is ,  
too. 
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If narrow scope for the subject requires an LF representation in which the 
subject is c-commanded by the adjective (as argued for in May 1 977 and more 
recently in Sportiche 1 996, Romero 1 997 and Fox 1 999) the antecedent and elided 
VP would not be identical at LF. This means that the identity condition must be 
allowed to hold at Surface Structure. The conclusion from ( 1 1 )  and ( 1 2) is that the 
identity condition can hold both at Surface Structure and at LF.8 This, of course, is 
not a contradiction, but I think it should inspire one to search for altematives.9 
2.3. An economy condition on accommodation 
As mentioned above, Tancredi' s  suggestion that E can be licensed only by Direct 
Parallelism cannot account for the availability of sloppy identity in ( 1 0) .  
Nevertheless, I would like to pursue the idea that what distinguishes E from PR is 
a condition on the availability of the accommodated sentences needed for Indirect 
Parallelism. This condition will have the effect of blocking Indirect Parallelism in 
(8) while (contrary to Tancredi) allowing it in ( 1 0) .  
What is the difference between (8) and ( 10) that might be relevant for the 
availability of Indirect Parallelism? The relevant difference,  I would like to 
suggest, is that ( 1 0) contains non-F-marked material (heard I was) which is not 
present in an antecedent sentence.  The presence of this material indicates that 
accommodation is necessary and (furthermore) indicates something about the 
nature of the required accommodation. In (8),  by contrast, there is nothing that 
indicates that accommodation is necessary and therefore (I would like to suggest) 
accommodation is impossible. 
What might indicate that accommodation is necessary in order to satisfy 
the focus requirements of a given sentence? A natural answer is the existence of 
overt (i.e. pronounced) constituents that are non-F-marked in the sentence and are 
nevertheless absent in the targeted antecedent. I will call these constituents the 
"accommodation-seeking material".  
In other wordd I would like to propose that given a potential antecedent, 
A, accommodation is possible only when the sentence containing E or PR, S, 
contains accommodation-seeking material . This economy condition is stated as 
follows :  
( 1 3) Accommodation of a new antecedent for S, AC, must have a trigger. 
( 14) Accommodation has a trigger when S contains accommodation-seeking 
material , i .e . ,  when S contains pronounced non-F-marked material which 
is absent in A . .  
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The intuition behind this proposal is that only accommodation-seeking material 
indicates that accommodation is necessary; other material is either: 
a. deleted (hence indicates nothing) 
b .  already present in the antecedent (hence indicates that accommodation is 
not necessary) or 
c .  F-marked (thus identified as "new information" - - indicating, once again, 
that accommodation is not necessary) . 
The condition in ( 1 3) distinguishes (8) from both (6) and ( 1 0) . In the next 
section, I will provide additional evidence in favor of this condition. However, it 
will turn out that ( 1 3) is a necessary but still insufficient condition for 
accommodation. In section 4, I will propose a stronger condition which will 
(hopefully) allow for accommodation in exactly those cases where it is possible. 
3. Further evidence in favor of the economy condition 
In the previous section we saw that an economy condition on accommodation can 
distinguish Ees which require Direct Parallelism from Ees and PRes which can 
be licensed only by Indirect Parallelism. With such a condition it is conceivable 
that the identity condition on ellipsis will not be needed to account for the 
differences between E and PRo In this section, I will provide independent 
evidence for the economy condition, and against an identity condition . 
Specifically, I will argue (a) that in cases where the identity condition on E is not 
at stake both E and PR cannot be licensed by Indirect Parallelism if the economy 
condition is not satisfied and (b) that when the economy condition is satisfied, 
Indirect parallelism is possible even in cases where an identity condition on E 
would not be satisfied. If successful, the first argument will make an identity 
condition on E redundant, and the second argument will make it untenable. 
3. 1 .  When Identity is not at stake 
3. 1 . 1 .  Identity of binding dependencies: The Ee in ( 1 0) argues (as pointed out in 
section 2.2.) that E can be licensed by Indirect Parallelism. This fact makes it 
impossible to distinguish between E and PR by claiming that sentences containing 
the former must satisfy Direct Parallelism, and thus supports the postulation of a 
separate identity condition on E. However, I made an alternative suggestion 
according to which ( 1 0) allows for Indirect Parallelism by virtue of the 
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accommodation-seeking material . This proposal predicts that without the 
accommodation-seeking material Indirect Parallelism will be unavailable. 
Evidence that this prediction is borne out comes from the contrast in ( 1 5) .  
( 1 5a) makes the same point that was made by ( 10) .  ( 1 5b) differs minimally and 
does not allow for sloppy identity. 
( 1 5) a. First John convinced Mary! that I was bad-mouthing heq , and then 
[Sue2]F came to believe that I was <bad-mouthing her2>. 
b. First John convinced Mary! that I was bad-mouthing heq , and then 
[Sue2]F [denied]F that I was *<bad-mouthing her2>. 
This contrast is unexpected without the economy condition stated in ( 1 3) .  The 
reason it is unexpected is that the focus value of the relevant sentence that 
contains E, SE, in ( 1 5b) properly contains the focus value of the parallel sentence 
in ( 1 5a). Therefore, by Parallelism as defined in (7) any antecedent for ellipsis in 
( 1 5a) should be an antecedent in ( 1 5b). More concretely, in ( 1 5b) the focus value 
of SE (= [Sue2h [deniedlF that I was bad-mouthing her2) contains all sentences 
of the form x V I was bad mouthing x. The antecedent sentence, A (= John2 
convinced Mary] I was bad-mouthing hey] ) ,  is not a sentence of the relevant 
form. However, it allows accommodation of a sentence AC (= Mary] came to 
believe that I was bad-mouthing heY]) which has the relevant form. 
Why, then, is sloppy identity blocked in ( 1 5b)? ( 1 3) provides the answer. 
SE lacks non-F-dominated material which is absent in A ,  and thus there is no 
trigger for accommodation. 
( 1 6) argues that ( 1 3) restricts PR as well as E. ( 1 6a,b) are the phonological 
reduction analogs of ( 1 5a,b) . ( 1 6c) shows that when ( 1 3) is not satisfied sloppy 
identity requires the pronoun to be focused (thus making accommodation 
unnecessary). (In ( 1 6c), F(SPR) is the set of sentences of the form x V I was bad 
mouthing y. A is a sentence of the relevant form if we make the independently 
needed assumption that convinced Mary is a possible alternative to deny.) 
( 1 6) a. First you convinced Mary! that I was bad-mouthing heq , and then 
[Fred2]F came to believe that I was bad-mouthing him2. 
b. *First you convinced Mary! that I was bad-mouthing heq , and then 
[Fred2]F [denied]F that I was bad-mouthing him2. 10 
c. First you convinced Mary! that I was bad-mouthing heq , and then 
[Fred2]F [denied]F that I was bad-mouthing HIM2. 
To complete the argument for ( 1 3) ,  it is important to show (empirically) 
that the potential accommodation (Ma ry ] came to believe that I was bad­
mouthing heY] ) is Directly Parallel to the E- or PR-sentence in ( I 5b, 1 6b).  In 
other words , it is important to provide empirical evidence that without ( 1 3) ,  
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Indirect Parallelism would wrongly predict Sloppy identity to be possible in 
these constructions. This evidence is provided in ( 1 7) .  Here the antecedent 
sentence is already (in all relevant respects) identical to the sentence that needed 
to be accommodated in ( I Sb, 16b) . The fact that sloppy identity is possible in ( 1 7) 
argues that the only thing that blocked sloppy identity in ( 1 Sb,  1 6b) is the 
unavailability of the accommodation. 
( 1 7) a. [Sue2]p came to believe that I was bad-mouthing her2. However, 
[Jane3]p [denied]p that I was <bad-mouthing her3>. 
c. [Sue2]p came to believe that I was bad-mouthing her2. However, 
[Fred3]p [denied]p that I was badmouthing him3 . 
The argument is re-enforced in ( 1 8) .  ( 1 8a, b) are very similar to ( 1 Sb, 1 6b), 
respectively. The only difference is that the LF which must be accommodated in 
( I Sb, 1 6b) to license sloppy identity is part of the discourse in ( 1 Sa, b) .  Therefore 
accommodation is unnecessary in ( 1  Sa, b) ; sloppy identity is available without it. 
( I S) a. First John convinced Mary! that I was bad-mouthing heft , and then 
[Sue2]p came to believe that I was <bad-mouthing her2> . But lucky for me at 
least [Jane3]p [denied]p that I was <bad-mouthing her3>. 
b. First John convinced Mary ! that I was bad-mouthing heft , then 
[Fred2]p came to believe that I was bad-mouthing him2. But lucky for me at 
least [Jane3]p [denied]p that I was bad-mouthing her3. 
3. 1 .2. Identity of Scopal Relations: In 3 . 1 . 1  I investigated a case in which the 
requirement of identical binding relations is obviated by Indirect Parallelism and 
argued that this obviation is possible only when there is  a trigger for 
accommodation. In this sub-section I would like to do the same for the 
requirement of identical scopal relationships. 
3. 1 .2. 1 .  Setting the stage: Consider ( 19-20) . The antecedent sentence in these 
constructions is disambiguated in favor of a scopal interpretation that corresponds 
to the surface c-command relations (Surface Scope) . 
( 1 9) a. Some boy admires every teacher and [Mary]p does, too. 
(3 > 'V) *('V>3) 
b. Some boy admires every teacher and [Mary]p admires every teacher, too. 
(3 >'V) *('V>3) 
(20) a. Someone from NY is very likely to win the lottery. [Jon]p is, too. 
(3)likely) *(likely>3) 
b. Someone from NY is very likely to win the lottery. [Jon]p is very likely to 
win the lottery , too. (3)likely) *(likely>3) 
The reason for this disambiguation is not crucial for the purposes of this paper, 
but for expository purposes, I will adopt the account I provided in Fox ( 1 995, in 
press). According to this account an economy condition on the mechanism that · 
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yields Inverse Scope (Scope Economy) restricts the E and PR sentences to 
Surface Scope (since Surface- and Inverse-Scope yield logically equivalent 
representations) . Consequently, Parallelism blocks Inverse Scope in the 
antecedent sentence. 
This combined effect of Scope-Economy and Parallelism is obviated in 
(2 1 )  and (22) (an abviation which we can call anti-disambiguation) . 
(2 1 )  a. Mary admires every teacher and some [boy]p does,  too. (3 >'V) ('V>3) 
b. Mary admires every teacher and some [boy]p admires every teacher, too. 
(3 > 'V) ('V>3) 
(22) a. Jon is very likely to win the lottery. Someone from [NY]p is, too. 
(3 >likely) (likely>3) 
b. Jon is very likely to win the lottery. Someone from [NY]p is very likely to 
win the lottery too. (3 >likely) (likely>3) 
Anti-disambiguation is expected given Indirect Parallelism. The reason is that the 
antecedent sentence allows for the accommodation of a sentence that would be 
parallel to the E or PR sentence under Inverse Scope. (If Mary admires every 
teacher it follows that for every teacher there is a girl who admires the teacher and 
if John is very likely to win the lottery it follows that it is very likely that someone 
from John' s city will win the lottery. II) 
Notice that the economy condition on accommodation, ( 1 3) ,  is satisfied as 
well. The subject of the E and PR sentences in (2 1 ,  22) contains non-F-Marked 
material that is absent in the antecedent, and hence accommodation has a trigger. I 
will now try to show that without the trigger disambiguation cannot be obviated. 
This is predicted by the economy condition and (if correct) argues in favor of it. 
3. 1 . 2.2 .  The argument: Consider the examples in (23-24) with unmarked 
pronunciation. (Pitch accent is represented with an acute accent.) Scope Economy 
together with Indirect Parallelism predicts anti-disambiguation in all of the 
examples in (23-24) . However, this prediction is not borne out in the (b) cases. 
(23) a. Jon is likely to win the lottery. Someone from New York is, too. 
(3 >likely) (likely>3) 
b. Jon is likely to win the lottery. Two people from New York are, too. 
(32 >likely) *(likely>32) 
(24) a. John likes every teacher. At least one girl does, too. 
(3 > 'V) ('V>3) 
b. John likes every teacher. At least two girls do, too. 
(32 >'V) *('V>32) 
This contrast is expected once the economy condition on accommodation 
is taken into account. To see this, we have to know the focus structure of the E 
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and PR sentences .  Given that pitch-accent falls on the most embedded 
constituent in the DP, there are two possibilities for F-marking (see Jackendoff 
1 972) . F-marking can target (a) the whole DP or (b) a smaller constituent which 
excludes the quantificational material (someone in (23a) and at least one in 
(24a» . 
Let ' s consider how Economy and Parallelism determine the LF 
representations of (23-24) given the constraint on accommodation in ( 1 3) .  I will 
focus on (24) and leave it for the reader to see that the account extends to (23) .  
Anti-disambiguation is predicted for (24a) . The basic idea is that disambiguation, 
which is the standard prediction of Economy and Parallelism, is obviated by the 
availability of Indirect Parallelism. (A (=John likes every teacher) entails A C  (=at 
least one boy likes every teacher with Inverse Scope), and A C is  an appropriate 
antecedent for SE (=At least one girl likes every teacher with Inverse Scope) 
The economy condition on accommodation is satisfied in (24a) if there is 
narrow focus on the common noun girl (as in (24'ai)) ,  but isn ' t  satisfied if there 
is focus on the whole DP (as in (24'aii» . 
(24'a) i .  �John likes every teacher] . [SE At least one [girl] F does ,  too] . 
(3 >\;;/) (\;;/>3) 
ii. �A John likes every teacher] . �JAt least one girl] F does, too] . 
(3 > \;;/) *(\;;/>3) 
Anti-disambiguation is predicted for (24a) , because (24'ai) is a possible focus 
structure 
Now consider (24b) and its two possible focus structures in (24'b) . When 
there is narrow focus on girls as in (24'bi), there is no way for Parallelism to be 
satisfied; F(SE) is the set of sentences of the form Every teachery at least two Nx x 
like y, and the available antecedent does not entail a sentence of this form; In 
particular, AC (above) does not belong to F(SE) because it contains the wrong 
numeral expression. 
(24'b) i .  �John likes every teacher] . * [ s  At least two [girls] F do, too] . 
ii. � John likes every teacher] .  [s; [At least two girls]F do, too] . 
(32 >\;;/) *(\;;/>32) 
If there is focus on the whole DP on the other hand, AC does belong to F(SE ) (the 
set of sentences of the form Every teachery QPx x like y) , but the economy 
condition on accommodation is no longer satisfied. 
Compare (23b) and (24b) with the pairs of sentences in (25) and (26) . 
(25) a. Jon and Bill are likely to win the lottery. Two people from New Y 6rk 
are, too. (32 >likely) (likely>32) 
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b. Jon, Bill and Fred are likely to win the lottery. A few people from 
New Y 6rk are, too. ( a f e w likely» 
(likely> a few) 
(26) a. John and Bill like every teacher. At least two girls do, too. 
(32 >'V) ('V>32) 
b. John, Bill and Fred like every teacher. A few girls do, too. 
(a few >'V) ('V> a few) 
In (25) and (26) narrow focus on the head noun allows for accommodation of an 
appropriate LF. The difference between these sentences and (23b, 24b) strongly 
suggests that the anti-disambiguation depends on the presence of accommodation­
seeking material . 
Compare now (23b) and (24b) with the construction in (27) ,  which were 
pointed out to me by Kai von Fintel . I assume that the focus structures of the two 
sentences are as represented in (27') .  
(27) a. John is likely to win the lottery. Two 6ther people from NY are, too. 
(32 >likely) (likely>32) 
b. John likes every teacher. Two 6ther boys do, too. (32 >'V) ('V>32) 
(27') a. John is likely to win the lottery. [Two] F [ [other] F people from NY] 
are, too] . (32 >likely) (likely>32) 
b. John likes every teacher. [Two] F [[other] F boys] do, too.  
(32 >'V) ('V>32) 
In both (27'a) and (27'b) , the economy condition on accommodation is satisfied. 
(In both cases accommodation is triggered by novel material which is non-F­
marked.) Furthermore, in both cases it is possible to accommodate an LF with 
Inverse Scope which will belong to the focus value of SE . To see this ,  focus on 
(27'b) : A entails the LF of a boy likes every teacher with Inverse Scope and the 
latter is a member of F(SE ) .  The relevant difference between (27b) and (24b) is 
that in (24b) the only way to satisfy ( 1 3) is by excluding the numeral two from the 
F-marked constituent, and such a focus structure makes Parallelism unattainable. 
In (27b) , by contrast, it is possible to focus the numeral and not the common 
noun, thus making the accommodatable LF an appropriate alternative to SE . 
3.2. When Indirect Parallelism allows ellipsis with no identity 
In 3 . 1  we saw that even in cases where an identity condition of the sort proposed 
by Rooth is satisfied, the effects of the economy condition on accommodation are 
nevertheless visible. If these cases have been analyzed correctly, it follows that an 
economy condition on accommodation must be postulated on grounds 
Focus , PARALLELISM AND ACCOMMODATION 
independent of the account of the difference between E and PR, thus making the 
identity condition redundant. In this section, I will examine a case in which an 
elided VP is allowed to be non-identical to an antecedent VP. This case is 
problematic for an identity condition on ellipsis . However, we will see that it  is a 
predicted consequence of focus theory together with an economy condition on 
accommodation. The upshot will be that the identity condition on ellipsis is not 
only redundant but also gives the wrong results. 
Consider the "abstract cause subject alternation" in (28) (Levin 1993 : 8 1 ) . 
(28) a. John proved that I 'm innocent with fingerprints . 
b. Fingerprints proved that I 'm innocent. 
Given this alternation, it seems reasonable to assume that the predicates in the two 
sentences assign different thematic roles to the subject and are thus not identical .  
Evidence that this is the case is provided by the impossibility of ellipsis in (29) . 
(29) a. *John proved that I 'm innocent. [Fingerprints]p did, too.  
b. *Fingerprints proved that I 'm innocent. [John]p did, too. 
The status of the construction in (29) is predicted by an identity condition of the 
sort proposed by Rooth. It is also predicted by Parallelism together with the 
economy condition on accommodation. (The antecedent sentence does not belong 
to the focus value of the ellipsis sentence and accommodation is impossible . )  
However, the predictions diverge in cases where the ellipsis sentence contains 
accommodation-seeking material. 
Evidence against the identity condition and in favor of the economy 
condition on accommodation comes from the contrast in (30) . 
(30) a. John proved that I 'm innocent. Fingerprints that [BILL]p presented did, 
too. 
b .  *Fingerprints that Bill presented proved that I 'm innocent. John did, 
too. 
Consider first the unacceptability of (30b) . The unacceptability of this 
sentence is by assumption the result of the elided VP and its antecedent being 
non-identical . Why then is (30a) acceptable. I suggest that in (30a) it is possible to 
accommodate the LF AC ( =Fingerprints that John presented proved that I 'm 
innocent ) and that AC E F(SE). 12 If this suggestion is correct, there must be 
something that blocks a similar accommodation in (30b) (Fingerprints that Bill 
presented proved that I 'm innocent => Bill proved that I 'm innocent) . The 
economy condition on accommodation serves this purpose; the ellipsis sentence 
doesn' t  contain novel material that is non-F-marked and therefore has no trigger 
for accommodation. 
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4. Strengthening the economy condition on accommodation 
In the previous section, I 've provided independent evidence in favor of an 
economy condition on accommodation. I 've attempted to show that the condition 
is needed independently of an account of the difference between E and PR, and 
that it can deal with certain cases that are problematic for Rooth' s identity 
condition. However, it turns out that there are still differences between E and PR 
that the economy condition cannot account for. 
In section 2 .3 ,  we saw that the economy condition distinguishes between 
(8)  and (6) (repeated below) based on the fact that (8 )  contains no 
accommodation-seeking material . 
(6) a. First Bill called Mary an idiot. Then [John]F insulted her. 
(8) a. * First Bill called Mary an idiot. Then [John]F did <insult her>. 
However, this explanation predicts that (8) would be rescued by minimal changes 
in the subject position; all that is needed is the addition of some accommodation­
seeking material . (3 1 )  demonstrates that this is not the case. The economy 
condition on accommodation in ( 1 3) is, therefore, too weak to account for the 
difference between E and PRo 
(3 1 )  *Every boy called Mary an idiot. Many GIRLS did too <insult her>. 
How is (3 1 )  different from the cases we' ve discussed in section 3 (in which the 
accommodation-seeking material licensed the necessary accommodation)? I 
would like to suggest that (3 1 )  doesn' t  allow the necessary accommodation (Many 
boys insulted Mary) because there is an alternative accommodation (Many boys 
called Mary an idot) which satisfies the requirements of the accommodation­
seeking material . More specifically, I would like to suggest that the economy 
condition on accommodation needs to be stronger. It is not sufficient for 
accommodation to have a trigger. For an accommodation to be possible it must be 
"minimal" given the trigger. An accommodation is minimal given a trigger when 
there is no alternative accommodation that is closer to the targeted antecedent and 
contains the trigger (the accommodation-seeking material) :  
(32) 
(33) 
Accommodation of a new antecedent for S, A C, must be minimal given 
the accommodation-seeking material in S,a. 13 
a. An accommodation, AC, is minimal given accommodation-seeking 
material a, if there is no alternative accommodation, A C ', such that 
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AC' contains a and AC' is closer to the existing antecedent sentence, 
A, than AC is. 
b .  AC' is closer to A than AC is, when the accommodated material of 
AC' is a proper subset of the accommodated material of AC. 
c .  The accommodated material of an accommodation AC consists of the 
lexical material which is present in AC and absent in A. 14 
The economy condition in ( 1 3) follows from the condition in (32) . (If S contains 
no accommodation-seeking material, the minimal accommodation is the trivial 
one AC=A.)  Consequently, the arguments I presented in section 3 in favor of ( 1 3) 
are also arguments in favor of (32) . (For reasons of space, I leave it for the reader 
to verify that in all the cases discussed in which accommodation was possible, the 
condition in (32) is satified.) 
5. A consequence for the nature of Focus 
Throughout this paper I' ve assumed that focus values are sets of LF structures .  
Under this view one sentence satisfies the focus requirements of  another when the 
LF structure of the former belongs to the focus value of the latter. However, since 
Rooth 1 985 it has been assumed that focus values are sets of unstructured 
meanings .  In this section, I would like to present two arguments in favor of the 
assumption that the members of a focus value are structured objects (either LF 
structures or structured meanings) . 
The first argument has already been presented in Wold 1 995, though under 
a slightly different approach to E and PR. Consider the following difference 
between E and PR, which was observed in Rooth 1992. 
(34) a. 7 is greater than or equal to 7. 5 is greater than or equal to itself, tOO.  
b .  7 is greater than or equal to 7.  5 is ,  too *<greater than or equal to itself>. 
This difference was taken by Rooth to be an additional argument in favor of an 
identity condition on E. The reason that E is not licensed in (34b), Rooth suggests, 
is that the VP and it' s antecedent are not identical . (The antecedent contains the 
name 7 in a position where the elided VP contains the anaphor itself.) 
Assuming that the arguments presented in this paper are successful there 
must be an alternative account for the contrast in (34) . More specifically, we 
would like the un acceptability of (34b) to follow from the unavailability of a 
necessary accommodation. However, if we assume that focus values are sets of 
unstructured meanings ,  (34b) would satisfy Direct Paral le l i sm and 
accommodation would be irrelevant. To see this consider the focus value of the 
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ellipsis sentence in (34b) . Under Rooth ' s  assumption, this focus value would 
contain the set of propositions which would result from applying the denotation of 
the matrix predicate (is greater than or equal to itself) to each alternative to the 
denotation of 5. One element in the focus vlue is [Ay. y [is greater than or equal 
to] y] ( [7]), which is an unstructured proposition identical to [7 is greater than or 
equal to 7], the denotation of the antecedent sentence. 
If we assume that the members of a focus value are structured objects 
(either syntactic structures, i .e. LFs,  or structured propositions) the problem is 
overcome. The focus value of the ellipsis sentence contains LFs (or structured 
propositions) of the form x Ay.y is greater than or equal to y, and the antecedent 
sentence doesn' t  have the appropriate form. In (34a) this could be corrected via 
accommodation of the LF 7 Ay.y is greater or equal to y but in (34b) 
accommodation is  impossible given the lack of accommodation-seeking material. 
Assuming that there is no identity condition on ellipsis , we are forced to 
conclude that focus values are sets of structured objects . The next argument in 
favor of the conclusion is independent of the status of an identity condition on 
ellipsis. Consider the ECs in (35), and their counterparts with PR in (36). 
(35) a. John likes every teacher. [At least two girls]p do, too. 
(32 >'V) *('v>32) 
b. Ken Hale speaks more than 3 of these Australian languages.  
Rob Pensalfini, doesn' t. (not>more than 3) *(more than 3>not) 
c. A boy is talking to Mary and a girl is, to every teacher. (3 >'V) *('V>3) 
(36) a. John likes every teacher. [At least two girls]p like every teacher, too.  
(32 >'V) *('V>32) 
b. Ken Hale speaks more than 3 of these Australian languages. 
Rob Pensalfini, doesn' t  speak more than 3 o/these Australian languages. 
(not>more than 3) *(more than 3>not) 
c. A boy is talking to Mary and a girl is talking, to every teacher. 
(3 >'V) *('V>3) 
In these constructions,  the ellipsis/reduction sentences are disambiguated in favor 
of Surface Scope. This should follow from Parallelism together with Scope 
Economy as outlined in section 3 . 1 .2 :  the antecedent sentence is semantically 
identical under its two potential interpretations and is therefore restricted to 
Surface Scope; consequently, given Parallelism (and given the fact that 
accommodation cannot obviate the verdict of Direct Parallelism in these cases, 
see Fox in press) the ellipsis sentence is restricted to Surface Scope. However, 
this result would be lost if focus values contain unstructured propositions .  The 
reason is trivial. The antecedent sentence is semantically equivalent under Surface 
and Inverse Scope. Therefore the proposition denoted by the antecedent is  
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identical irrespective of the syntactic scopal relations. In other words, whether 
or not the antecedent denotes a proposition in the focus value of the ellipsis 
sentence will be determined irrespective of the syntactic structure of the 
antecedent. This means that there is no way for Parallelism and Scope Economy 
to account for the disambiguation in (35-36) .  If, on the other hand, focus values 
contain structured objects, disambiguations follows straightforwardly . 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that E and PR obey the same constraints . They both 
obey a parallelism condition which is a direct consequence of focus theory and an 
economy condition on accommodation. The differences between E and PR is not 
a consequence of an identity condition on E. Rather it follows from the fact that 
the economy condition on accommodation is sensitive to accommodation-seeking 
material of which there is much more in PRo 
Endnotes 
• The ideas presented in this paper are implicit but not fully developed in Fox in 
press, chapter 3 .  I would like to thank Noam Chomsky, Martin Hackl, Kai von 
Fintel, Irene Heim, David Pesetsky, Mats Rooth, and especially Jon Nissenbaum. 
1 Throughout this paper, I use CAPS for syllables that receive pitch accent, small 
italics for constituents that are phonologically reduced (and hence receive no pitch 
accent) , and the subscript F for constituents that are focused. 
2 Various interesting questions arise regarding the nature of focus ,  and in 
particular focus projection. See Fox, in press, chapter 3 footnotes 1 0  and 1 1 .  
3 Contrary to standard assumptions, I take focus values to be sets of syntactic 
structures (rather than sets of unstructured meanings). The focus value of a given 
sentence is the set of LF structures that are identical to the LF of a sentence 
modulo the focus-marked constituents (which can be substituted by appropriate 
alternatives). Evidence in favor of this view of focus is presented in section 5 .  
When I talk about a sentence, S, being a member of a focus value, this should be 
understood as a statement about the LF structure of S .  
4 The focus values in  (5)  should be understood as  sets of  LF structures (see 
footnote 3 ) .  This means that the variable x should range over NPs which are 
appropriate alternatives to John (i.e. , NPs that denote individuals). 
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5 Of course PR is possible also when there is no antecedent in the discourse. In 
such a case shared assumptions allow the accommodation of AC. Whether or not 
ellipsis is possible with no overt antecedent depends on ill-understood factors . See 
Johnson 1997 and references therein. 
6 A problem arises with respect to the examples in (3) .  Why is it impossible to 
have a Surface Scope parse for antecedent sentence and an Inverse Scope parse 
for the ellipsis sentence (given that in these cases Surface Scope entails Inverse 
Scope)? The economy condition that I propose in sections 2 .3  provides a partial 
answer. My hope is that one can re-formulate the economy condition in a way that 
will provide a better account. In any event, the problem arises for PR as well as 
for E and is thus independent of whether or not there is an identity condition on E. 
7 Some speakers don't  allow for any sloppy identity in (9) . The judgment of these 
speakers are irrelevant for Rooth' s  argument. Rooth ' s  point is that if sloppy 
identity is possible in (9) under parallel dependencies, it is possible in ( 1 0) with 
non-parallel dependencies, hence the argument for Indirect Parallelism. 
8 A similar conclusion could potentially be drawn from Jacobson ' s  ( 1 998)  
observation that a relative clause with pied-piping can be  elided when its 
antecedent contains no pied-piping: 
(i) This is the man I met. And this is the man the FAther of whom I did. 
If Pied-piping involves obligatory reconstruction, the VPs are not identical at LF. 
Jacobson uses the paradigm to argue against obligatory reconstruction, but it can 
also be seen as an argument against an identity condition (see Fox 1 999b) .  
9 Jacobson ( 1998) argues that the identity condition raises conceptual problems 
for non-variable-Free semantics : Rooth' s identity condition (as pointed out in 
Heim 1 997) must ignore variable names, and no explanation is offered for this 
fact. To the extent that there are arguments in favor of variables (and to the extent 
that there is no natural explanation for the fact that variables are ignored) there 
might be an argument here against the identity condition. 
10 Mats Rooth (p.c.) points out that the effect disappears if we replace the focus 
verb deny with the verb doubt. He also pointed out that this difference would 
follow if doubt decomposes to not >agree. Not could be focused and agree can 
serve as accommodation-seeking material . Deny might decompose to claim >not, 
but given that there is no accommodatable antecedent that contains the verb claim 
with Mary as subject, both claim and not would have to be focused. 
1 1  For a more detailed discussion, see Fox (in press).  
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12 That the accommodation is necessary is evident from the fact that (30a) is good 
only under the (accommodated) assumption that John used fingerprints in his 
proof. 
In Fox (in press) I use the minimal pair in (i) , which makes the same point. 
I changed the construction here to make the role of accommodation more evident. 
(i) a. *What John said revealed my identity. [Bll.,L]F did, too. 
b. Bill revealed my identity. What [John]F said did, too. 
1 3  Given this minimality requirement, and elided VP can be non-identical to the 
antecedent VP only in cases where the accommodation-seeking material i s  
inconsistent with an identical VP. This is the case in (30a), but not in  (3 1 ) . 
1 4 This definition is not quite right. It is easy to construct examples which will 
demonstrate that the accommodated material of an accommodation AC should be 
defined as the lexical material which is present in AC and not present in A in a 
parallel syntactic position. Of course one would have to define parallel syntactic 
position. This can be overcome by the following alternative to (33b) : 
(33b') AC' is closer to A than AC is, if F (AC', A) c F(AC, A) . 
F(X, Y) := Min { Fss(Y') : SS(X)e Fss(Y') and Y' differs from Y in at 
most the placement of focus }  . 
Fs s (A) := { S :  S is identical to SS (A) modulo focus marked 
constituents } 
SS(A) := The Surface Structure of A. 
The reason I need to appeal to Fss(A) rather than to a simple focus value is the 
phenomena of anti-disambiguation discussed in 3 . 1 . 2 .  The necessary 
accommodation for anti-disambiguation (the accommodation with Inverse Scope) 
is a sentence which doesn' t  belong to the focus value of the antecedent, A, unless 
A receives sentential focus. Therefore, if the definition of ' closer' were to appeal 
to standard focus values, the potential accommodation with Surface Scope would 
block the necessary accommodation with Inverse Scope. However, the 
accommodation with Inverse Scope belongs to Fss(A) when only the subject is 
focused, and thus is a minimal accommodation. 
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